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Much of the variation in living standards across countries can ultimately be traced 
back to differences in productivity (Hall and Jones 1999, Trefler 1995). What explains 
these differences in productivity? Recent work shows that variation in cross-country 
productivity is at least as much due to foreign as due to domestic innovation (Eaton and 
Kortum 1999, Keller 2002a). It suggests that to better understand cross-country variation 
in productivity, we may need to learn more about the international transfer of technology. 
  Foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade have long been suspected to be major 
conduits of international technology transfer. Both have grown faster than GDP recently, 
and foreign-owned companies account now for almost one-sixth of U.S. manufacturing 
GDP, for example.
1 It is thus now more important than ever to ascertain whether in fact 
FDI and trade do lead to international technology transfer. Policy prescriptions of 
international organizations such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization are 
critical of discriminatory policies towards foreign investors and exporters. And far from 
discriminating against foreigners, countries all over the world spend large amounts of 
resources to attract foreign multinationals, on the assumption that FDI leads to 
technology transfer and subsequent productivity gains for domestic firms. To give but 
one recent example: the U.S. state of Alabama has spent $ 230 million ($150,000 per 
newly created job) to attract a new plant of Mercedes in 1994 (Head 1998).
 2 Such large 
subsidies can only be justified if FDI, or imports for that matter, generate substantial 
                                                 
1 See Zeile (2002) and U.S. national accounts data at www.bea.gov. 
2 Hanson (2001) and Görg and Greenaway (2002) discuss other major cases, as well as the broader 
evidence indicating that in contrast to the 1960s and 1970s, recently foreign investment has been favored 
relative to domestic investment. The value of the FDI incentives is typically the present discounted value of 
the sum of direct subsidies, e.g. in form of the publicly provided infrastructure, and tax reductions.   2
positive externalities, or technology spillovers for domestic firms. In this paper, we will 
estimate the size of spillovers associated with imports and the activities of multinational 
enterprise (MNE) affiliates that constitute FDI. 
Notwithstanding large subsidies given to multinationals, the conventional wisdom 
on FDI spillovers today is that they do not exist or are at best of minor economic 
importance (see section 2). Our analysis revisits this view. With a sample of about 1,100 
U.S. firms for the years 1987 to 1996, we find evidence for substantial FDI spillovers: 
according to our preferred estimates, FDI spillovers accounted for about 14% of U.S. 
productivity growth over this period. There is also some support for imports-related 
technology spillovers, but overall our evidence on imports is less conclusive.  
A second contribution of this paper is that we give an account of possible reasons 
for our high spillover estimates relative to the large literature that found only minor 
effects. For instance, if our different finding were due to an improved estimation, it 
would be more likely to be a general result than if it were due to a particular sample. It 
appears that our results are primarily due to improved measurement of foreign 
multinational activity. On this basis, we argue that our results are likely to generalize 
once such data is available in other circumstances as well.  
The following section briefly reviews the evidence on technology spillovers 
associated with imports and FDI, before we present our model and the estimation 
framework in section 3. Section 4 gives an overview of the data, with more detail 
provided in the appendix. All estimation results can be found in section 5, while section 6 
contains some concluding summary and discussion. 
   3
2.  Technology spillovers through trade and FDI 
Imports and inward FDI have often been emphasized as being spillover channels. 
Importing a technologically advanced commodity might trigger learning that enables 
domestic producers to manufacture a similar good at lower costs at home. Another 
possibility is that the price does not fully reflect the quality of the imported good, which 
might be due to market power on the part of the buyer or problems of appropriability for 
the seller.  
FDI might also be associated with spillovers for domestic firms because workers 
that embody the firm-specific knowledge asset of the MNE affiliate can be attracted to 
domestic firms (Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde 2001), because multinationals give access to 
new specialized intermediate inputs (Rodriguez-Clare’ 1996), or because domestic firms 
use local intermediate goods suppliers whose productivity has been raised through the 
know-how of the MNE. In these and other instances, it is a priori plausible that market 
prices do not necessarily reflect the full benefits and costs. 
  Several authors have recently examined the question of whether there are 
technological externalities associated with trade. A first set of papers has looked for 
international R&D spillovers driven by imports. In an influential paper, Coe and 
Helpman (1995) have related productivity to the import-share weighted R&D of the 
countries’ trade partners, estimating a positive regression coefficient. Xu and Wang 
(1999) have strengthened these results by focusing on machinery instead of all imports. 
At the same time, Keller (1998) generates almost as strong results with counterfactual 
instead of observed import data. This underlines that the evidence for imports-related 
technology spillovers on the basis of these regressions is not very strong. More recent   4
research has sought to provide a more powerful empirical framework by employing more 
disaggregated data and allowing for alternative spillover channels in addition to imports. 
This has produced mixed results so far: for instance, Keller’s (2002b) industry-level 
analysis of technology spillovers among the G-7 countries finds evidence in support of 
imports-related effects, while Kraay, Isoalaga, and Tybout (2001) in their study of firm 
productivity dynamics in three less developed countries do not.
 3 
  A number of different methods have been employed to study FDI spillovers. 
There are, first of all, a number of case studies of recent large-scale FDI, and these 
studies have produced somewhat mixed results.
4 Outside the event-study literature, an 
increasing number of authors have estimated FDI spillovers using data on repeated cross-
sections of firms or plants. This has a number of advantages relative to cross-sectional 
estimation at the industry or aggregate level; for instance, it is less likely to lead to 
spurious results due to unobserved heterogeneity.  
Among these studies, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that an increase in the 
presence of foreign-owned affiliates is associated with lower productivity in a sample of 
Venezuelan plants in the late 1970s and 1980s. The authors attribute this result to strong 
competition and average cost effects—e.g., incoming foreign-owned affiliates hire the 
most highly skilled workers away from domestic plants—that outweigh any positive FDI 
spillovers that might exist. Girma and Wakelin (2001) as well as Haskel, Pereira, and 
Slaughter (2001) have studied inward FDI for the United Kingdom while trying to 
                                                 
3 Analogous to imports, other work has provided evidence on learning externalities associated with exports; 
it is relatively weak so far as well (e.g., Clerides, Lach, and Tybout 1998). See Keller (2001) for further 
results and discussion. 
4 Larrain, Lopez-Calva, and Rodriguez-Claré (2000) argue that Intel’s investment in Costa Rica in 1997 
generated substantial benefits for the local economy, whereas Hanson’s (2001) discussion of three other 
recent cases suggests spillovers are non-existent or small.   5
control for changes in the degree of competition to isolate FDI spillover effects. Both 
studies find evidence for positive FDI spillovers, although the estimated productivity 
effects for U.K. plants are small: according to Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2001), e.g., 
FDI spillovers account for only about 5% of the TFP growth in British manufacturing in 
the two decades from 1973 to 1992.
5  
Summarizing, there is some evidence for imports-related technology spillovers, 
but it is far from ubiquitous, and in particular, the evidence becomes weaker when micro 
data and econometrics based on an explicit behavioral model is used. With respect to 
FDI, there too is stronger evidence for spillovers when more aggregated data is 
employed. Among the panel studies based on micro data (to which this literature has 
gravitated), only two find statistically significant positive effects of FDI on domestic firm 
productivity, and these effects are small in an economic sense. In conclusion, there is no 
evidence for strong positive technology spillovers associated with FDI.
6 Naturally, this 
would imply that providing substantial subsidies to multinationals to facilitate technology 
transfer to domestic firms is a misguided policy.  
We now turn to our analysis that revisits these issues. 
 
3.  Model and estimation framework 
Since there is no consensus on the existence of strong spillovers, we take a broad 
view on how FDI and imports might affect the productivity of domestic firms. Instead of 
                                                 
5 This discussion has focused on estimates of the magnitude of intra-industry FDI spillovers in terms of 
domestic productivity, which constitutes the largest and most influential literature. Another approach is to 
identify technology transfer by patent citations; Branstetter (2000), e.g., shows that FDI between the U.S. 
and Japan is associated with higher knowledge flows in terms of patent citations of U.S. and Japanese 
firms. Two studies emphasizing the importance of inter-industry spillovers are Blalock and Gertler (2002) 
as well as Kugler (2002). We will return to the question of inter-industry FDI spillovers in section 6. 
6 Two recent surveys come to the same conclusion, see Hanson (2001), Görg and Greenaway (2002).   6
modeling a particular mechanism, our approach is to ask whether there is evidence for 
higher productivity of domestic firms in industries when there is more foreign activity in 
terms of FDI and imports. By and large, this is the question that has been asked so far, 
with the answer being non-affirmative (see section 2 above).  
Our analysis relies on correctly measuring firm productivity. To this end we 
employ the methodology developed by Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Olley and Pakes 
(1996).
7 These authors develop a framework for dynamic industry equilibrium analysis 
where firms optimally choose sales and investment, as well as entry and exit. For our 
purposes, two aspects of the Olley and Pakes approach are most important: first, it allows 
for firm-specific productivity differences that exhibit idiosyncratic changes over time, 
and second, the model endogenizes the firm’s liquidation decision by generating an exit 
rule. These features address two major concerns that have afflicted productivity 
calculations for a long time: simultaneity and selection biases. To see this, consider the 
following equation: 
(1)   , 0 it it k it m it l it u k m l y + + + + = β β β β  
where yit is the logarithm of output of firm i at time t, and correspondingly, lit, mit, and kit 
are the firm’s (log of) labor, materials, and capital inputs. The last term, uit, is an error 
representing all disturbances that prevent (1) from holding exactly. Let this term be 
composed of two parts, 
(2) . it it it u η ω + =  
Consider the case when neither ωit and ηit are observed by the econometrician, 
whereas the firm cannot observe ηit, but it does know ωit. The term ηit could be capturing 
                                                 
7 The following introduces only the most salient features of their approach. See also Griliches and Mairesse 
(1995) for more discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Olley-Pakes approach.   7
unpredictable demand shocks while ωit could be firm productivity, for instance. If ωit is 
known to the firm, the optimal labor input choice will be a function of ωit, and simple 
OLS estimation will suffer from a simultaneity bias because  [ ] . 0 | ≠ it it l u E
8 If the term ωit 
is constant over time, ωit = ωi, all t, taking time- or within-firm differences of (1) and 
proceeding with OLS on the transformed data can lead to consistent parameter estimates. 
But in our framework, ωit is firm productivity, and how this changes in relation to imports 
and FDI is exactly the question we are asking. This strategy is therefore ruled out. As 
shown below, we will identify ωit from the firms’ investment choices. Knowing ωit allow 
us to control for the simultaneity of input choices, and thus to avoid this bias. 
We now turn to the selection problem. The firm maximizes the expected 
discounted value of its future net cash flows. At the beginning of the period, the firm 
learns its productivity ωit, which is assumed to evolve according to an exogenous Markov 
process. Then, the firm makes three choices. It decides whether to exit or not, it chooses 
variable factors (labor and materials), and how much to invest in capital. For a 
sufficiently low value of ωit, a firm’s value of continuing in operation will be less than 
some (exogenous) liquidation value, and it will exit; call the threshold level at which a 
firm is indifferent between exiting and staying  t ω . 
  One can show that if the firm’s per-period profit function is increasing in k, the 
value function must be increasing in k as well, while  t ω  is decreasing in k. The reason is 
that a firm with a larger capital stock can expect larger future returns for any given level 
of current productivity, so that it will remain in operation at lower realizations of ωit. 
                                                 
8 The existence of this bias depends on the possibility that input choice can be varied; this explains why we 
use the example of labor as an input, which is generally considered to be not subject to large adjustment 
costs. In the multivariate case, the OLS bias can usually not be unambiguously signed. However, if labor 
and capital are positively correlated, and labor is more strongly correlated with ωit than capital, then OLS 
will tend to overestimate βl and underestimate βk.   8
Relatively small firms exit at productivity draws for which relatively large firms would 
have continued to operate, so that the relatively small firms that stay in the market tend to 
be those that received unusually favorable productivity draws. The correlation between 
ωit and kit is negative, and failing to account for the self-selection induced by exit 
behavior will lead to a negative bias in the capital coefficient. The Olley and Pakes 
approach generates an exit rule, so that we can account for this self-selection and avoid 
the associated bias. 
  In terms of estimation, we take the following steps. In equations (1), (2), we 
assume that labor and materials are variable inputs so that their choice is affected by ωit, 
whereas capital kit is only determined by past values of ω, not the current one. Dropping 
the firm subscript for ease of notation, let it be the firm’s optimal investment choice at 
time t. Provided that  , 0 > t i  it is possible to show that investment is strictly increasing in 
ωt for any kt.
9 This means that the investment function can be inverted to yield 
(3) ). , ( t t t t k i h = ω  
Substituting (3) and (2) into (1) gives 
(4) , ) , ( t t t t t m t l t k i m l y η φ β β + + + =  
with ) , ( ) , ( 0 t t t t k t t t k i h k k i + + = β β φ . Because  (.) t φ contains the productivity term 
(.) t t h = ω  that is the source of the simultaneity bias, equation (4) can be estimated to 
obtain consistent estimates βl and βm on the variable inputs, labor and materials. Equation 
(4) is a partially linear regression model of the type analyzed by Robinson (1988), and we 
                                                 
9 The requirement that investment must be positive may be limiting for some applications. Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2001) propose therefore a variant of Olley and Pakes’ approach in which productivity is identified 
from materials inputs (which is usually greater than zero). In our sample, the zero-investment problem is 
negligible.   9
use a fourth-order polynomial in investment and capital to capture the unknown function 
(.) t φ .
10  
  With consistent estimates of βl and βm in hand, we proceed to estimating the effect 
of capital on output, βk, which is not identified in (4) because it is combined with 
capital’s effect on investment. We assume for simplicity that kt is uncorrelated with the 
innovation in ωt, , 1 − − = t t t ω ω ξ  or, ωt is a random walk (this can be generalized). 
Substituting this into (4) gives 
(5)  , ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 t t t k t t k t m t l t k k m l y η ξ β φ β β β + + − + = − − − −  
where  1 ˆ
− t φ  comes from estimating (4), and   1 1 ˆ
− − − t k t k β φ  is an estimate of ωt-1.  
The probability of survival to period t depends on ωt-1 and  ` 1 − t ω , the unobserved 
level of productivity that would make a firm shut down its operations, which can be 
shown to depend only on capital and investment at time t-1. We generate an estimate of 
the survival probability by running a probit regression on a fourth-order polynomial in 
capital and investment (lagged by one period); the estimated survival probability is 
denoted by  t P ˆ . The final step is to estimate βk from the resulting equation: 
(6)   . ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ ˆ
1 1 t t t t k t t k t m t l t P k g k m l y η ξ β φ β β β + + − + = − − − −  
Here we approximate the unknown function g(.) by a fourth-order polynomial in 
1 1 ˆ
− − − t k t k β φ  and  t P ˆ ; βk is then estimated non-linearly across all terms that contain it. 
 
                                                 
10 This includes all cross terms, and we allow this function to vary over time for the subperiods 1987-90, 
1991-1993, and 1994-1996.   10
Using the estimates of coefficients of labor, materials, and capital, we estimate 
log total factor productivity as  it k it m it l it it k m l y tfp β β β ˆ ˆ ˆ − − − = . Our empirical analysis 
relates firms’ TFP growth,  it tfp ∆ , to changes in the degree of foreign activity through 
imports ( it IM ∆ ) and FDI ( it FI ∆ ) at the industry level: 
(7) , ' 2 1 it it it it it e FI IM X tfp + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ γ γ β  
where X’it is a vector of control variables, and  it e  is an error term; the exact definitions of 
it IM ∆ ,  it FI ∆ , and X’it are discussed in the following data section. 
  
4. Data   
This study is based on data on an unbalanced sample of manufacturing firms in 
the United States from Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Compustat includes 
only publicly traded companies and publishes data from the companies’ balance sheets 
according to legal reporting requirements. Unlike census data, the Compustat database 
has the advantage of being publicly available. Moreover, it includes most of the larger 
U.S. firms, which means that- as in Griliches and Mairesse (1984), as well as Jovanovic 
and Rousseau (2002), e.g.- we cover the major portion of all U.S. economic activity. As 
we show below (see 5.1), the cross-industry variation in our productivity estimates 
resembles closely that of U.S. manufacturing as a whole. 
Our sample consists of a total of 1,115 U.S.-owned firms that were active between 
the years 1987 to 1996, covering about 58% percent of U.S. manufacturing employment 
and roughly 70% of U.S. manufacturing research and development expenditures. From 
Compustat, we obtain data on the firms’ (log) output y, as well as (log) labor, materials,   11
and capital inputs (l, m, and k), where our output measure is net sales.
11 Firm sales are 
deflated by a common deflator at the three-digit SIC level that we have constructed from 
the Bartelsman and Gray (2001) NBER Productivity data base, while the deflators for the 
capital stock come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Also from Compustat comes data 
on the firms’ R&D expenditures, which is a likely determinant of productivity; log R&D 
expenditures are denoted by rit. Not all data is available for all firms; for instance, a 
significant number of firms (about 15%) do not report material input usage. In some 
cases we have had to fill in small amounts of missing data, typically for the firms’ capital 
stocks.
12 
Our primary interest is whether productivity is related to the importance of imports 
and foreign-owned affiliates in the firm’s relevant economic environment. We measure 
the importance of imports for a given firm by the share of U.S. imports in imports plus 
total shipments of the industry to which the firm belongs; this variable is denoted by 
it IM . Correspondingly, the importance of FDI is measured by the share of foreign 
affiliate employment in total employment of the industry to which the firm belongs 
(denoted by  it FI ). Our analysis is at a relatively detailed, two to three-digit SIC, industry 
level. This is determined by the roughly 50 industries in which the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA), responsible for reporting U.S. FDI data, is classifying total 
manufacturing activity; see Table 1 for a list of the industries. For our sample period we 
                                                 
11 Data on the flow of materials usage is estimated from the change in the firm’s stock of materials; for this 
and other details of the variables’ definitions and construction, see the appendix. 
12 Because large firms often span several industries, our matching of firms to industries is imperfect and 
introduces measurement error in our dependent variable. A different part of Compustat contains more 
detailed (line of business) data for sales, but unfortunately not for all inputs. Analyzing productivity at the 
plant instead of the firm level might help; not infrequently though, plants are operating in several industries 
as well. To address measurement error concerns, we conduct a wide-ranging robustness analysis.   12
choose the years 1987 to 1996, because before and after this period there have been 
changes in the BEA’s industry classification. 
Data on foreign employment comes from confidential affiliate level data collected by 
the BEA in its annual surveys.  This data is aggregated from the affiliate level to the level 
of the industry classification that we use. The employment figures are based on the 
industry classification of the activity of individual affiliate employees rather than the 
industry classification of the affiliate as a whole, by its mainline of business.
13 The 
former is preferred, because it avoids the sudden shifts of a large number of employees 
from one industry to another industry that is associated with data on employment for the 
entire affiliate if the affiliate’s mainline of business changes. The imports data is obtained 
from Feenstra (2002), and the values for total shipments and employment by industry 
come from Bartelsman and Gray (2001).  
These measures of imports and FDI broadly capture the prevalence of foreign 
economic activity in a particular U.S. industry. If specialized imports are important in 
triggering technology spillovers, or if foreign affiliates of MNEs generate positive 
externalities for U.S. firms by building up more efficient supplier chains or a pool of 
highly skilled technicians, it is plausible that this is correlated with our measures of 
foreign presence in that industry.
14 
                                                 
13 An affiliate’s mainline of business is the industry in which the affiliate has the majority of its sales. In 
BEA's annual surveys of foreign direct investment in the United States for the years covered in this study, 
large affiliates were required to specify their employment (as well as sales) in the eight industries in which 
their sales were largest; other affiliates had to specify their employment (and sales) in the three industries in 
which their sales were largest. 
14 These measures will not be able to pick up externalities that are generated between major industries 
(vertical production specialization); however, many important buyer-supplier relationships will be within 
our still relatively broadly defined industry classification. Another interesting aspect that we do not cover is 
the spatial dimension of technology spillovers, in particular, whether they are geographically localized. 
Keller (2001) reviews some of the evidence.   13
The Olley and Pakes method of computing firm productivity addresses the 
problem of simultaneity in input choices, but the endogeneity of imports or FDI could be 
an issue as well. For instance, FDI could be attracted to industries in which productivity 
is growing relatively fast on average. This would lead to a positive correlation of FDI and 
productivity which does not provide evidence for FDI spillovers.
15 Instrumental variable 
estimation is a way to address this issue; however, here we do not have good instruments, 
because the variables that are highly correlated with FDI and imports are also likely to be 
correlated with productivity. Instead, endogeneity issues of this kind are addressed by 
considering the effect of both contemporaneous and lagged foreign activity on 
productivity, as well as other robustness analysis. 
A number of other variables will be employed to better isolate spillover effects 
(see the appendix for variable construction). First, we include a variable that picks up the 
degree of capacity utilization (denoted as CU). For instance, the number of workers a 
firm hires is likely to be positively related to both hours worked as well as sales, which 
means that we might be overestimating the coefficient on labor if capacity utilization is 
not controlled for. Second, we have noted above that it is important to control for changes 
in the degree of market competition that might be associated with changes in foreign 
activity. We follow Nickell (1996) and others and use the firm’s market share in the 
industry as well as the firm’s mark-up and the industry mark-up to capture these effects 
(denoted by MS, FM, and SM, respectively). To the extent that a higher market share or a 
higher firm mark-up, conditional on the industry’s overall mark-up indicate less 
                                                 
15 Alternatively, it could be that FDI is attracted to weak domestic industries to capture these markets. In 
that case, the correlation of cross-industry productivity growth and inward FDI might well be negative.   14
competitive pressures, we expect that a firm’s productivity growth slows down, all else 
equal. 
There is a substantial degree of unobserved heterogeneity across firms in different 
industries in our sample. Productivity growth in some industries is higher than in others 
due to factors unrelated to imports and FDI, an example being the advances in the 
information technology and communications industry during our sample period. We 
therefore allow for exogenous differences in productivity growth across industries by 
including industry fixed effects, αj, in the specifications below. We also include time 
fixed effects, αt, in all regressions, because our sample period covers the 1990/91 U.S. 
recession. The baseline estimation equation is given by 
(8) 
. 2 1
2 5 2 4 2 3 2 1
it it it
it it it it it t j it
FI IM
SM FM MS CU r tfp
ε γ γ
β β β β β α α
+ ∆ + ∆ +
+ + ∆ + ∆ + + + = ∆ − − −  
Here,  it ε  is a mean-zero error term, and ∆ indicates a one-year difference, so that  it FI ∆ , 
for example, is the change in the share of foreign-affiliate employment in total 
employment in consecutive years. 
  We now turn to the empirical results. 
 
 
5. Empirical  Analysis 
It is useful to analyze the main trends over the sample period by industry before 
discussing the regression results. There are large differences across industries. For 
instance, there are three industries for which the firms’ labor input is declining on 
average by more than 5% annually (Grain mill products [SIC 204], Beverages [SIC 208], 
and Apparel [SIC 230]), while at the same time there are four industries for which   15
employment is growing annually by more than 5% per year on average (these are Drugs 
[SIC 283], Metal cans [SIC 341], Farm and garden machinery [SIC 352] and Specialized 
industry machinery [SIC 355]). 
  The U.S. firms in our sample have increasingly been exposed to import 
competition. In 1987, the average ratio of imports to imports plus shipments was 12.9%, 
while by 1996, this import share had risen to 16.5%. The annual growth of imports these 
firms were facing was almost twice as high as the growth in industry shipments. In 
addition, the increase in the import share has been more or less monotonic. There has 
been a substantial amount of variation across industries, however. Between 1987 and 
1996 the import share in apparel grew by 8.7 percentage points, whereas it fell for motor 
vehicles by about 2.6 percentage point, as Table 2 indicates. 
The share of U.S. manufacturing employment accounted for by foreign-owned 
affiliates has been growing over time as well, from 7.7% in 1987 to 11.7% in 1996. 
However, in this case, we can distinguish two separate phases of FDI dynamics. Between 
1987 and 1993, FDI grew particularly strongly, from 7.7% to 11.6%. In the aftermath of 
the 1991 recession, however, the pace of FDI into the U.S. slowed down, and in 1996 the 
share is 11.7%.
16 There were differences across industries, with FDI growing in food 
manufacturing by 1.5 while growing in motor vehicles by 8.0 percentage points. It is no 
accident that the industry that experienced the second-largest FDI increase—motor 
vehicles—is also the industry where the import share has least increased: overall, the 
correlation in Table 2 between changes in import and FDI tends to be negative, although 
not significantly so. 
                                                 
16 The general trend towards greater internationalization has continued, however. According to the latest 
available figures from the BEA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), in the year 2000, the share of 
foreign employment in U.S. manufacturing was 14.4%; see Zeile (2002) and www.bls.gov.   16
Figure 1 compares the sales shares in our sample with the sales shares in the 
NBER Productivity Data Base, Bartelsman and Gray (2001), each by BEA industry 
average over the sample period. Clearly, our sample does not exactly reflect the relative 
industry sizes in U.S. manufacturing as a whole. For instance, the figure shows that we 
have a substantially larger share of computer industry firms (SIC 357) in our sample than 
exists in the U.S. economy as a whole, while other industries such as motor vehicles (SIC 
371), appear to be somewhat underrepresented in our sample. While we note that the rank 
correlation of BEA industry sales shares in the two samples is positive (and significant), 
the composition of our sample will have to be taken into account when we interpret the 
results.  
 
5.1  Olley-Pakes Production Function Elasticities 
Table 3 reports the production elasticities for capital, labor, and materials that we 
estimate using the Olley-Pakes (O-P) method described above. We have tried several 
specifications that differ in the set of variables that is included as right-hand side 
variables in stage one, equation (4) from above, and columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 give 
some indication of the range of estimates that is obtained.
17 In specification O-P (1), we 
follow Griliches and Mairesse (1995) by including a general trend and a differential trend 
for computers as regressors in the first stage, because the computer industry has 
experienced exceptionally high productivity growth over this period. The elasticities are 
estimated to be 0.300, 0.466, and 0.256 for capital, labor, and materials, respectively. 
Without the trends, the capital elasticity falls to 0.251 (see O-P (2)).  
                                                 
17 These specifications differ in (1) whether we allow the investment function to vary over time or not; (2) 
whether we use capital investment, or capital investment plus acquisitions minus divestitures; and (3) 
whether we include R&D expenditures as a regressor or not.   17
For comparison purposes, we also show the OLS estimates of the elasticities. 
These lead to significantly lower capital and materials estimates, with 0.200 and 0.164, 
respectively; these results are consistent with simultaneity and exit leading to an 
important downward bias on the capital coefficient. Also on the basis of the estimated 
scale elasticities (between 0.98 and 1.02 for Olley-Pakes, and 0.83 for OLS), the Olley-
Pakes estimates seem to be preferred.  Firm TFP is therefore computed using the 
elasticity estimates of the preferred specification O-P (1). Further, we have examined 
how our TFP growth figures compare to those of the NBER Productivity Database, and 
found the correlation of the two series to be high.
18 Our sample reflects the cross-industry 
variation in productivity growth for U.S. manufacturing as a whole well in this sense.
19 
 
5.2 Baseline  Results 
Turning to the regression results, we begin by estimating equation (8) using one-
year differences.  The benefit of using one-year differences is that we can make 
maximum use of the time variation in our data.  One aspect of this variation that is of 
critical interest in our analysis is the time span over which spillovers might occur.  To 
this end, we use measures of the change in import and multinational activity that are 
contemporaneous and lagged one and two years.  Because we may exacerbate problems 
                                                 
18 The correlation of average TFP growth in the sample with TFP growth in the NBER database is 0.89 (at 
the level of the 48 BEA industries of Table 1, weighted by sales). 
19 We use the same production function elasticities for computing firm TFP in all industries. This is 
primarily because we have on average only about 20 firms per BEA industry (and often less), which would 
make BEA industry-specific elasticity estimates very imprecise. In order to relax the common-elasticity 
assumption, though, we have estimated separate Olley-Pakes elasticities for broad industry groups. 
Splitting manufacturing into two groups, the ten low labor- and ten high labor share two-digit industries--
based on Bartelsman and Gray (2001)--, for instance, we estimate an O-P labor coefficient of 0.434 for 
firms in the former, and 0.494 for firms in the latter group. This is in line with expectations. At the same 
time, these two estimates are not different at standard levels of statistical significance. Moreover, we have 
confirmed that the restriction of common elasticities does not affect the main imports and FDI spillover 
results.   18
of error-in-variables by relying on short-run movements, we experiment with longer time 
differences below. 
The results are shown in Table 4. The columns correspond to different 
specifications that vary in the timing of import and MNE activity relative to subsequent 
TFP growth and to different industry controls.  The first four columns correspond to 
specifications in which we include a full set of industry indicators variables (coefficients 
suppressed).  Allowing for industry controls is crucial if there are unobserved industry 
characteristics not captured by our controls that might affect both TFP growth rates and 
the extent of foreign activity as measured by both imports and FDI.  In the fifth column 
we report estimates obtained by estimating equation (8) without industry dummies.  In 
the final column, we report estimates obtained by estimating equation (8) allowing for 
both industry specific intercepts and time trends. In all cases, the standard errors reported 
in parentheses are both heteroskedasticity consistent and adjusted for clustering at the 
level of the firm. 
There is data on 839 firms for the specification with a full set of contemporaneous 
and lagged foreign activity variables and industry fixed effects shown in column one. We 
first consider the controls.  In the first row is the coefficient corresponding to 
contemporaneous levels of R&D expenditure.  The coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that firms that conduct greater research and development efforts do 
experience faster TFP growth. This result is consistent with the literature as reported by 
Griliches (1995).  In the second row is the coefficient for our capacity utilization variable. 
The negative coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis that measured TFP rises during 
periods of intense capital usage. In the third and fourth row are the two-year lagged   19
change in firms’ market share and the firm’s mark-up, included as controls for changing 
product market competition. Both are negative, the latter marginally significant. This 
suggests that firms enjoying a strong position in the product market show less TFP 
growth as would be consistent with non-pecuniary slack enjoyed by monopolists.  Our 
final control is industry average markups, again lagged two years, as shown in the fifth 
row.  Interestingly, the coefficient on industry mark ups is positive and statistically 
significant, which may reflect cyclical industry effects that are not captured by our 
measure of capacity utilization. 
Turning to the foreign activity variables, rows six through eight show the 
coefficients for FDI activity; this is defined as the change in the share of MNE affiliate 
employment in total industry employment, both contemporaneous as well as lagged. The 
results reveal that current and one-year lagged FDI growth are associated with faster TFP 
growth while two-year lagged FDI growth is associated with slower TFP growth.  Of 
these three coefficients only the current and one-year lagged variables are statistically 
significant.  The F-test reported at the bottom of the table reveals that as a whole the three 
coefficients are statistically significant at a high level of confidence. These estimates also 
suggest that to the extent that there are spillovers from FDI, they have been fully reflected 
in domestic TFP within two years.
20 
Now consider the coefficients on imports shown in rows nine through eleven.  A 
similar pattern emerges in these coefficients: the current and one-year lagged measures 
are positive while the two-year lagged measure is negative.  Another similarity is that the 
                                                 
20 That the relationship of productivity with FDI lagged twice is estimated to be so different from 
productivity’s relationship with FDI lagged once is consistent with our estimation capturing FDI spillovers; 
if instead our estimates would pick up primarily common trends or endogeneity, it is not clear why timing 
would matter that much.   20
three coefficients are jointly significant at high levels of confidence as indicated by the F-
test at the bottom of the table.  Like the two-year lagged FDI measure, the coefficient on 
two-year lagged imports is not statistically significant on its own.  Again, the results are 
consistent with technology spillovers through imports that occur fairly rapidly. 
To confirm our hypothesis on the timing on potential spillovers in the data, we 
show the results in columns two through four of estimating a single measure of foreign 
penetration at different lags. In each of these specifications, the time span of the sample 
varies so that the number of firms in the sample varies across columns as well. The 
results reported in columns two through four are highly consistent with those reported in 
column one despite the slight change in sample size.  Some of the sample composition 
change is captured in the controls such as R&D and Market Share, which change 
substantially across samples.  We also note that the absolute size of coefficients on our 
foreign activity variables are slightly smaller in magnitude, but their relative size and 
statistical significance is comparable to the results in column one.
21  
In column five, we report the estimates obtained by dropping the industry fixed 
effects to gauge the potential importance of unmeasured industry characteristics in 
driving both foreign activity and TFP growth.  In the interest of space, we focus our 
discussion of these results on the FDI and imports variables. The coefficients on the 
current and lag-one FDI variables are small in size, and the two-year lag variable 
becomes negative and statistically significant. This would suggest that the net effect of 
FDI as measured by the sum of the three coefficients on FDI is negative, as some earlier 
                                                 
21 This seems in part due to the fact that the additional firms that enter the sample are primarily smaller, 
poorly performing firms that subsequently disappear from the sample; see more on the effects of sample 
composition below. 
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studies have found. In contrast, the coefficients on the import variables move in exactly 
the opposite direction. All three coefficients are larger now than in column one, and all 
coefficients are now individually statistically significant.  These results would suggest a 
very large role for imports-related spillovers in observed TFP growth in the United 
States. In fact, we think that these results primarily suggest that unobserved industry 
characteristic play an important role in both the extent of foreign activity and TFP 
growth, and that industry fixed effects should therefore be included. 
Specifically, the result that including industry fixed effects affects the coefficients 
on FDI and imports in opposite direction is consistent with much of the theoretical 
literature on trade and FDI in which these two mechanisms for serving a distant market 
are generally modeled as substitutes.  If this substitution were at work in our data, then 
we might expect FDI and imports to respond to unobserved industry characteristics in 
opposite directions. That unobserved industry characteristics are important in explaining 
cross industry TFP growth rates is clearly seen by comparing the R-squared of the two 
regressions. Adding the fixed effects doubles the R-squared suggesting that at a 
minimum, fixed effects explain half the variance in the total specification.   
  By including fixed effects by industry, we control for time invariant determinants 
of TFP growth across industries that are also potentially correlated with the import and 
FDI variables.  There may also be time varying determinants of these foreign activity 
variables, such as changing factor prices and transportation costs to name two, which are 
not controlled in the intercept fixed effect specification.  Hence, we explore the effect of 
estimating a model with both industry fixed effects and industry time trends.  The results 
of this are shown in column six.   22
  Including industry specific trends has several interesting consequences for the 
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients.  Among the controls, the effect of estimating 
industry specific trends is to drive the coefficient on industry markups to zero from its 
large value in the intercept fixed effect specification (in column one).  Among the import 
and FDI variables, including an industry specific trend in addition to industry specific 
intercepts primarily eliminates the negative point estimate on two-year lagged imports 
and FDI respectively. 
Overall, our results so far suggest that there are technology spillovers associated 
with both imports and FDI. Only in the specification without industry specific fixed 
effects is there no evidence for positive FDI spillovers, but as we have discussed above, 
our results strongly suggest that industry fixed effects should be part of the specification, 
due to unobserved heterogeneity in TFP growth across industries that are correlated with 
changes in foreign activity. We think that column one is the preferred specification, with 
the sum of the significant point estimates of about 1.09 and 1.13 for FDI and imports, 
respectively.




We first consider estimations with longer time differences.  The benefit of 
considering longer differences is that doing so will give relatively more weight to more 
persistent changes in the variables of interest and hence reduce the influence of noise.  
The cost of this is that longer time differences reduce the number of observations and the 
size of the sample in terms of the number of firms observed.  As a compromise, we 
                                                 
22 To make sure that our results are not excessively influenced by outliers, we have also considered 
alternative estimation techniques such as median and robust regression; overall, these results were similar 
to or stronger than the least squares results.   23
experiment with two and three-year differences but consider only the relationship 
between contemporaneous change of FDI and imports with firm level TFP growth since 
adding lags would seriously strain the time span of the data. 
Table 5 shows the results. The first column corresponds to the two-year 
specification while the second to the three-year specification, and column three repeats 
the corresponding regression with one-year differences from Table 4 for convenience. 
We now focus on the coefficients on FDI and imports.  For FDI, the point estimate 
increases from about 0.35 to about 0.50, which is consistent with the longer differences 
specification capturing some of the contemporaneous and lagged effects of the baseline 
specification (Table 4, (1)). Also the estimates on the imports variable increase relative to 
the one-year specification, but an important difference is that imports are not statistically 
significant while FDI is. This suggests that in general, the baseline results do not seem to 
be driven by short-term noise in the data, while at the same time the evidence for FDI 
related spillovers seems stronger than for spillovers associated with imports. 
 
Second, an important consideration in our analysis so far is that our measures of 
foreign activity with respect to both FDI and imports are changes in ratios of foreign 
activity to total activity.  At one extreme, it is thus possible that all of the variance in our 
measures of exposure to foreign activity comes purely from changes in total activity. To 
rule out the possibility that TFP growth is related only to total activity and not to foreign 
activity, we now consider a specification in which both foreign and total activity by 
industry is allowed to have its own effect.  Our new measure of changes in multinational 
activity is the absolute yearly change in employment at foreign multinationals normalized   24
by lagged total employment by industry. To gauge the effect of the change in total 
employment on TFP growth, we define a new variable, Total Employment.  This variable 
is the absolute yearly change in total employment by industry normalized by lagged total 
employment.  In effect, including this variable allows the denominator of our measure of 
FDI activity in the baseline specification to have an independent effect on TFP growth.  
Variables for real import growth and real sales growth by industry are defined 
analogously.   
  In Table 6, we report two sets of results, corresponding to the case with and 
without industry specific trends. The results are highly consistent with the baseline results 
shown in Table 4.  Both FDI and import growth appear to be associated with TFP growth, 
and the effect appears to occur within two years.  Note that increases in total employment 
are generally associated with slower TFP growth.  This result is sensible when one 
considers that producing output using fewer resources is the nature of productivity 
growth.  The coefficients on real sales growth are negative and not statistically 
significant.  The reason that real sales growth appears to have no effect is that its effect is 
captured entirely by the industry indicators and time trends.
23 
  While the actual magnitudes of the coefficients reported in Table 6 are not 
directly comparable to those reported in Table 4, the signs and statistical significance is 
comparable and turns out to be very similar. This means that our baseline results are not 
an artifact of the manner of construction of our measures. 
 
                                                 
23 Dropping industry dummies and time trends yield coefficients on real sales growth which are both 
positive and statistically significant.   25
Third, the extent to which FDI and imports effects exist could depend on the 
particular time period. To begin with, TFP growth in the United States appears to have 
been particularly strong relative to other years in the mid 1990s, which correspond to 
almost half of our sample.  Another feature is that our sample period contains the descent 
into the 1990 recession, with the subsequent recovery. While we cannot compare our 
results to those that would obtain over other time periods, we can ask whether there are 
significant differences between the coefficients that we would obtain in the early, 
recessionary 1990s to those coefficients that obtain in the boom years of the mid-1990s.  
To firmly distinguish between the two time periods we omit the middle year of 1993. 
Table 7 presents these results, with the estimates that correspond to the years 1990-1992 
in column one, the results for the years 1994-1996 in column two, and for comparison 
purposes, we repeat the results that obtain for the full sample period in column three.   
There are several differences in the estimated coefficients for the two time 
periods.  With respect to FDI, the coefficients for 1994-96 are all larger than the 
corresponding coefficients for the period of 1990-92, and in the later period also the two-
years lagged FDI coefficient is positive and significant, which is not the case during 
1990-92. At the same time, the joint effect of FDI is still significantly positive at a 10% 
level also in the years of 1990-92. In contrast, the differences between the imports 
coefficients for the two sample periods are more pronounced than for FDI.  In the 
relatively slow TFP growth period of the early 1990s, imports are not associated with 
TFP growth, while in the more rapid TFP growth period of the later 1990s, a positive 
relationship between imports and TFP growth emerges for the contemporaneous and one-
year lagged variables.    26
Overall, these results suggest that while the partial correlation between FDI and 
TFP growth varies across periods, our qualitative finding on FDI spillovers is robust 
across two periods that are quite different in terms of cyclical economic activity. The size 
of the imports-related spillovers, however, is highly dependent on the period, which 
confirms the earlier result -of Table 5, Longer Differences- that the evidence for 
spillovers associated with FDI activity is stronger than that for imports related 
spillovers.
24 
In the following, we turn to discussing the economic significance of our spillover 
findings. 
 
5.4  Importance of spillovers in accounting for U.S. productivity growth 
This section assesses the magnitude of the economic impact of foreign spillovers on 
productivity growth in the U.S. that is suggested by our estimates. We first consider FDI. 
The share of foreign employment in U.S. manufacturing rose between 1987 and 1996 
from 7.7% to 11.7%, or by 4.0 percentage points. Our preferred estimate of the FDI 
spillover effect on productivity is based on the first specification in Table 4. There, the 
significant coefficients are 0.547 (for current FDI) and 0.543 (for one-year lagged FDI), 
which sums to a total effect of 1.090. Based on our Olley-Pakes input elasticity estimates 
(O-P (1) in Table 3), we estimate an average productivity growth in our sample of 0.301 
over the sample period of 1987-96. This means that an estimate of the share of 
                                                 
24 As for other robustness analysis, we have considered the possibility that imports-related spillovers are 
primarily associated with intermediate, not final goods imports. Using the 1987 U.S. input-output table, we 
have estimated the share of imports that are intermediate goods. Estimations based on this alternative 
imports variable did not lead to very different results, however. In addition, we have experimented with 
MNE sales in total sales as an alternative to the FDI employment variable. This leads to estimates that are 
less robust across specifications, as well as less precise, and sometimes not significantly different from 
zero. In line with the literature so far, we focus on FDI employment, which is also preferred in terms of fit. 
Measurement error is a likely explanation for the difference, an issue we will return to in section 6.4 below.   27
productivity growth that is accounted by FDI spillovers according to our estimates is 
about 14% (1.090*0.040/0.301). In our view, this means that technology spillovers 
associated with FDI activity could be large enough to matter substantially in economic 
terms, that is, for productivity growth and welfare.
25 
Recall that much of the earlier literature estimating FDI spillovers with micro data 
found no or economically small effects. An important question therefore is why our 
estimates are considerably larger. We turn to this issue in the following. 
 
6.  What explains the relatively strong FDI spillovers estimated in this paper? 
A number of factors could explain why we estimate larger FDI spillover effects 
than those that have been obtained in earlier studies. While our analysis cannot be 
complete, it is important to discuss at least some of the major issues, because this will 
allow us to see whether our results can be generalized to other settings. 
 
6.1 FDI spillovers in the United States 
The productivity of firms in the U.S. during this period has on average been 
relatively high, and perhaps higher than in any other country of the world. It might 
therefore be at first somewhat surprising that we try to estimate technology spillovers to 
these already productive firms.  Two points are worth noting in this respect. 
On the one hand, the relatively high average productivity of U.S. firms masks a 
large amount of heterogeneity across U.S. firms, and the typical foreign-owned affiliate 
                                                 
25 An analogous calculation for the effect of imports, based on the results of specification one in Table 4, 
would suggest that imports account for a share of about 27.5% of productivity growth in the U.S. over the 
sample period. However, as shown above, the imports estimates are less robust than the FDI estimates, and 
more work is needed to firmly establish the magnitude of spillovers related to imports.   28
in the U.S. is likely to have a higher productivity than the average U.S.-owned firm in the 
same industry (see Doms and Jensen 1998). On the other hand, it could be that we 
estimate strong FDI spillovers not despite, but because U.S. firms are relatively 
productive compared to the domestic firms in other countries. That is, perhaps a 
relatively high productivity is required for a firm to acquire FDI related spillovers; in the 
U.S., there are relatively many such firms, and consequently, we estimate relatively large 
FDI spillovers. It is possible that such threshold effects for benefiting from FDI spillovers 
exist, but some recent evidence suggests that it cannot be the whole story.
26 
 
6.2 Estimation: Simultaneity and competition effects 
It could also be that some of the earlier -low- FDI spillover estimates have been due 
to changes in product or factor market competition when multinational affiliates enter. If 
these effects would be important here as well, we would expect -to the extent that our 
market share and mark-up variables capture these effects- that our FDI spillover estimates 
fall substantially once the competition controls are removed from the regression. 
However, it turns out that doing this leads only to minor changes, suggesting that our 
higher FDI spillover estimates are not due to controlling relatively well for change-in-
competition effects. 
  What about the impact of using the Olley-Pakes as opposed to other, in particular  
                                                 
26 In their broad sample, Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2001) estimate that less productive (and smaller) 
plants receive on average stronger FDI spillovers than more productive (and larger) ones. Moreover, these 
authors study FDI spillovers to U.K. plants, whose productivity is not much below that of U.S. firms. 
Nevertheless, their spillover estimates are only about one third of what we estimate.   29
differencing estimators? In an attempt to isolate this effect, we have estimated 
specifications with sales as the dependent, and capital, employment, and materials as 
independent variables, analogous to equation (8) above: 
(9) 
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Across a number of specifications, this gives results that are quite similar to the 
corresponding regressions with the Olley-Pakes measure of firm TFP as the dependent 
variable. Specifically, the partial correlation of adjusted sales and FDI (as in eq. 9) is 
similar to that of Olley-Pakes TFP and FDI (based on eq. 8). If our analysis gives a 
different picture on the importance of FDI spillovers compared to earlier work, it does 
not seem to be much related to differences in FDI point estimates based on one or the 
other estimation strategy. 
  At the same time, the capital, labor, and materials coefficients estimated with the 
time differencing specification (equation 9) vary substantially from the O-P elasticity 
estimates. The time differencing estimates are similar to those shown in Table 3 (third 
column): the estimates for capital and materials are much lower, and the labor elasticity is 
somewhat larger than based on O-P, with a time differencing scale elasticity estimate of 
about 0.8. This lower scale elasticity translates into an overestimate of TFP growth in the 
sample: on average, firm TFP growth over the years 1987-96 is estimated to be 45.4% 
with the time differencing method, instead of 30.1% with the O-P method. 
Correspondingly, a given FDI spillover point estimate would account for only about 10%, 
not 14% of U.S. productivity growth in manufacturing (10% equals 1.090*0.040/0.454). 
Thus, by allowing a more plausible estimate of in-sample TFP growth, the choice of   30
estimation approach contributes to explaining why economically important FDI 
spillovers are estimated. 
 
6.3  Sample composition: a large share of high-technology firms  
Another possible reason for why we estimate a relatively strong relationship 
between FDI and TFP might lie in the composition of this sample. As noted above, our 
sample contains firms that are disproportionately in “high-tech” sectors relative to the 
U.S. economy.  The composition of the sample matters if spillovers vary in strength from 
one industry to another.  In particular, if spillovers are more likely in high-tech industries, 
then our results will tend to overstate the contribution of FDI and imports in generating 
TFP growth in the economy as a whole. 
  We explore this possibility by dividing the sample into two groups, referred to as 
high- and low-tech industries.  To define these groups, we sorted industries by their 
average R&D intensity and then chose a cutoff level of R&D intensity to yield two 
categories with roughly similar number of firms.  We choose R&D intensity as our metric 
for dividing the sample because we conjecture that spillovers are more likely to occur in 
industries in which firms are likely to develop proprietary knowledge. 
Roughly half the firms in the sample are in eight high-tech industries.   These 
industries are the four chemical industries, computers and office equipment, electronic 
components, scientific instruments, and medical instruments.
27 To expand the number of 
low-tech firms, we drop R&D as an explanatory variable at this point because it is 
missing for a number of those firms.  This expands the number of firms in our sample 
from 839 to 1115. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 8. 
                                                 
27 In terms of BEA codes of Table 1, these are industries 281, 283, 284, 289, 357, 367, 381 and 384.   31
  The first column in Table 8 is the preferred specification (Table 4, column 1) 
estimated on the pooled sample of both high- and low-tech firms without R&D as a 
regressor. The results in the expanded sample are remarkably similar to those shown in 
Table 4, except that the coefficients on the foreign activity variables are moderately 
smaller. This change suggests that there may be systematic differences between low- and 
high-tech firms. This hypothesis is confirmed in columns two and three, which 
correspond to the high-tech and low-tech samples, respectively. In the high-tech sample, 
all three measures of FDI enter positive, and both the current and one-year lagged 
variable are statistically significant. In the low-tech sample, in contrast, none of the FDI 
variables enter with a significantly positive sign, and the two-year lagged coefficient is 
negative and significant. Similar differences appear for the import measures and also the 
control variables. 
  These results are informative because they suggest that to the extent that 
spillovers occur, they occur in the high-tech sector. They are also intuitively plausible.  
First, most of the TFP growth in the sample is in the high-tech sector.  Second, one would 
expect that it precisely is these high-tech industries where there is likely to be knowledge 
that can be imparted on domestic firms. In the low-tech sector, market competition 
effects are more likely to dominate any potential spillovers from foreign firms.   
  The heterogeneity in the response of TFP to imports and FDI activity across 
industries is important for the interpretation of the aggregate results.  Our sample features 
disproportionately firms that pursue R&D and hence are more likely to show evidence of 
spillovers in the aggregate than samples more reflective of the composition of U.S. 
industry. This means that one cannot use our point estimates to compute the contribution   32
of FDI spillovers to productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing as a whole. At the same 
time, our estimate from section 5.4 above—that FDI spillovers account for about 14% of 
TFP growth over the period 1987 to 1996—takes this sample composition effect into 
account. We compare the FDI spillover estimates to the TFP growth in our sample, not to 
productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing as a whole. Indeed, the composition of our 
sample affects both FDI spillover elasticities and TFP growth—both is relatively high in 
our sample—so that our analysis of the extent to which FDI spillovers account for TFP 
growth is meaningful.
28 
In summary, this suggests that sample composition is in part responsible for our 
relatively high spillover point estimates, but it does not necessarily affect the estimate of 
the extent to which FDI spillovers account for productivity growth. If FDI spillovers are 
primarily found in high-tech industries, however, as Table 8 seems to indicate, this 
suggests that empirical studies should focus on these high-tech industries, because there 
does not seem to be something like an ‘average’ FDI spillover effect that can be found 
across high and low-tech industries. There could be FDI spillovers in low-tech industries, 
but given our results, it seems more plausible that they take the form of inter-industry 
spillovers- spillovers to low-tech industries from FDI in high-tech industries. 
 
6.4  Measurement error: FDI by mainline of business versus by activity 
Another feature of our analysis that might explain why we estimate relatively 
large FDI spillovers lies in different procedures for measuring the extent of FDI.  As 
mentioned earlier, we construct the FDI variable by aggregating up to the industry level 
                                                 
28 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, multi-factor productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing as a 
whole for the period of 1987-96 was 6.7% (BLS 2002), versus an Olley-Pakes estimated average TFP 
growth of 30.1% in our sample.   33
the number of employees engaged in particular activities, which is below the affiliate 
level. This differs from earlier studies in which the foreign employment figures 
underlying the FDI variable are based on the affiliate’s mainline of business, that is, each 
affiliate’s workforce has been entirely allocated to one particular industry. Because 
foreign affiliates are often diversified and have employees in several industries, our 
approach avoids the mismeasurement of industry FDI associated with changes in the 
affiliates’ mainline of business that causes large year-to-year jumps in measured foreign 
employment. 
  To assess the extent to which this difference could be important, we compare our 
results with those obtained by measuring FDI employment by the affiliate’s mainline of 
business, see Table 9. In the first column of Table 9 we repeat the results from the 
preferred specification, Table 4, column 1. In the second column are the results 
corresponding to the alternative, and we would argue flawed, measure of FDI based on 
affiliate mainline of business.   
  A comparison of the FDI coefficients for the two ways of measuring multinational 
activity confirms that measurement matters. The sum of the significant FDI-by-mainline 
of business coefficients are only about one seventh of the coefficients in the preferred 
FDI-by-activity specification, and FDI is not significantly correlated with TFP anymore 
at a 5% level for FDI-by-mainline of business. This result is consistent with the standard 
intuition that mismeasurement of an explanatory variable will tend to bias the coefficient 
estimate towards zero. 
It thus appears that the proper measurement of the extent of foreign multinational 
activity makes a big difference. At the same time, none of the recent studies estimating   34
no or small FDI spillovers uses, as far as we know, similarly detailed measures of FDI as 
are employed here. This suggests that a major reason for why we estimate economically 
large FDI spillovers while earlier work did not is due to the accurate measurement of FDI 
in the domestic market.  Moreover, there is some reason to believe that our results will 
generalize to other countries and time periods, because to the extent that our estimates of 
FDI spillovers depend primarily on the foreign activity being measured accurately, it 
should be possible to revise FDI spillover estimates upward in other settings as soon as 
better data becomes available. 
We now turn to a concluding summary and discussion. 
 
7.  Summary and discussion  
Governments all over the world spend large amounts of resources in order to attract 
multinational companies to their region or country, often based on the assumption that 
such companies generate various types of positive externalities, or spillovers, to domestic 
firms. This stands in sharp contrast to the influential recent literature that has used micro-
level data to provide econometric evidence for such FDI spillovers—without finding 
much. In this paper, we estimate international technology spillovers to U.S.-owned 
manufacturing firms via imports and FDI between the years of 1987 and 1996. In contrast 
to earlier work, our results suggest that FDI leads to significant productivity gains for 
domestic firms. The size of FDI spillovers is economically important: we estimate that 
they accounted for about 14% of productivity growth of U.S. firms. There is also some 
evidence for imports-related spillovers, but it is weaker than for FDI.   35
The paper also provides an account of why our study leads to results different from 
those found in previous work. There are a number of major factors. First, employing 
Olley-Pakes’ estimation method versus the more frequently used time-differencing 
method leads to a substantially greater role for FDI spillovers. According to our analysis, 
this is primarily so because Olley-Pakes results in a better estimate of in-sample 
productivity growth, not because it is more strongly correlated with changes in FDI than 
time differencing productivity. Second, the estimated FDI spillovers are much larger in 
the relatively high-technology industries than in the relatively low-technology industries. 
Given that Compustat includes high technology firms more than proportionately, this 
clearly explains in part our high spillover point estimates, though it does not necessarily 
imply a larger contribution of FDI spillovers to productivity growth, because high 
technology firms’ productivity was growing particularly fast. A third factor that turns out 
to be important is the measurement of inward FDI in the host economy. In fact, it appears 
that the single biggest reason of why we estimate stronger FDI spillovers than others is 
due to our relatively accurate measure of industry FDI, which is aggregated from sub-
firm records on the industry of employment activity. Overall, we argue that therefore our 
results are likely to generalize to other countries and periods once FDI activity can be 
properly measured. 
Our research suggests a number of future research directions. For one, the 
heterogeneity of FDI spillover strength across industries reflects in part heterogeneity in 
the motivation for FDI. Not all FDI is equally likely to transfer technology 
internationally, which suggests a promising avenue of future research is to focus on 
specific industries and mechanisms. Another issue is whether the literature so far has   36
taken a sufficiently broad view of the effects that MNEs’ entry might have, including 
inter-industry effects, the more long-run effects (e.g. of worker training programs), and 
signaling effects to other potential foreign investors.  
For the time being, the results in this paper provide the strongest evidence that we are 
aware of that may support the provision of subsidies to attract FDI from a viewpoint of 
social welfare. Another important question, of course, is whether a socially optimal 
policy is indeed implemented, given the political-economic realities of local electoral 
competition.   37
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Appendix: Variable definitions, sources, and data construction 
 
•  Sales (denoted Y): Net sales, from Compustat’s Industrial data file (data item 12); 
deflated by industry-level price index aggregated up from Bartelsman and Gray 
(2001). 
•  Labor (L): Number of employees, from Compustat (data item 29). 
•  Capital (K): value of property, plant and equipment, net of depreciation, from 
Compustat (data item 42); deflators are from the BEA satellite accounts.  
•  Materials (M): The firm’s flow usage of materials is estimated, based on firm-
level year-end materials inventory stocks (Compustat’s data item 76). To get an 
average relationship between materials stocks and flows, we correlate the (log of) 
stock of raw materials inventory and the (log of) flow of raw materials usage 
across 4-digit SIC industries, from Bartelsman and Gray (2001) and 
Manufacturing Census data kindly provided by Wayne Gray; this relationship is 
roughly proportional (factor: 0.962). Deflators from Bartelsman and Gray (2001). 
•  R&D (denoted by R): Research and development expense, from Compustat (data 
item 46); deflators are from the BEA satellite accounts until 1992; beyond that, 
we have estimated them using the variation across industries and over time of the 
deflators for capital. 
•  Capacity utilization (CU): is defined as the ratio of capital stock over total hours 
of production workers, at the BEA industry level; aggregated up from the 4-digit 
SIC data in Bartelsman and Gray (2001). 
•  Firm mark-up (FM): Defined as firm’s sales over sales minus profits; profits is 
measured by net income, Compustat data item 172. 
•  Industry mark-up (SM): Analogous to firm mark-up, at the industry level. 
•  Market share (MS): Defined as firm sales over total BEA industry sales 
(constructed from Bartelsman and Gray 2001). 
•  Import share (IM): U.S. imports by industry, from Feenstra (2002), over U.S. 
imports plus total shipments by industry; the latter from Bartelsman and Gray 
(2001). 
•  FDI share (FI): Foreign affiliate employment by industry of activity, aggregated 
from the affiliate level to the BEA industry level, over total U.S. employment by 
BEA industry; source: confidential affiliate level FDI data at the BEA. 
•  Investment: Capital expenditures, from Compustat (data item 128); investment 
deflators by 4-digit SIC industry are from Bartelsman and Gray (2001). 
 
Following Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), we have also computed and used an 
alternative investment series that takes into account acquisitions (Compustat data item 
129) and divestitures (Compustat data item 107). 
 
To obtain our sample, we have started out with all manufacturing firms that were active 
between 1987 and 1996. We first removed the foreign-owned firms from the sample, and 
cleaned the data from obvious errors. This left 2,648 firms for which we had sales, 
capital, and employment data for at least two consecutive years, which is necessary for 
our dynamic estimation framework. Of these firms, 2,334 report materials, and 1,675 
report both materials and R&D.   41
 
For these 2,648 firms, we have plotted each individual time series on sales as well as on 
capital stock, employment, materials, and R&D. Firms for which any time series 
exhibited implausibly large year-to-year changes were removed. We have also dropped 
firms that displayed large changes in inputs while output was flat, or vice versa. 
Moreover, we have also adopted a conservative stance on including firms where output 
and inputs do not seem to reflect a reasonably stable relationship to estimate production 
function parameters; this is particularly true for upstart firms where the recording of 
inputs and outputs does not always seemed to be well synchronized, and likewise for 
failing firms. When in doubt on any of these criteria, we have dropped the firm from the 
sample. This procedure led to 839 firms that report output and inputs including R&D 
expenditures, and 1,115 firms if we include the firms that do not report R&D (see Table 
4, (1) and Table 8, (1) respectively). Table 1: Industry Classification of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
BEA Code BEA Name BEA Code BEA Name
Food and kindred products  Primary metal industries 
201 Meat products  331 Ferrous 
203 Preserved fruits and vegetables  335 Nonferrous 
204 Grain mill products 
208 Beverages  Fabricated metal products 
209 Other food and kindred products  341 Metal cans, forgings, and stampings 
342 Cutlery, hardware, and screw products 
Other Manufacturing 343 Heating equip., plumbing and structural
210 Tobacco  349 Metal services, ordnance, and nec
310 Leather
390 Miscellaneous Machinery 
351 Engines and turbines 
Textile and Apparel 352 Farm and garden
220 Textile mill products  353 Construction, mining, and material handling
230 Apparel and other textile products  354 Metalworking
355 Special industry
Wood and Furniture 356 General industrial
240 Lumber and wood products  357 Computer and office equip.
250 Furniture and fixtures  358 Refrigeration and service industry
359 Industrial machinery, nec 
Paper 
262 Pulp, paper, and board mills  Electronic
265 Other paper and allied products  363 Household appliances 
366 Audio, video, and communications
270 Printing and publishing  367 Electronic components and accessories 
369 Electronic, nec 
Chemicals and allied products 
281 Industrial chemicals and synthetics  Transport Equipiment
283 Drugs 371 Motor  vehicles
284 Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods  379 Other transportation
287 Agricultural chemicals 
289 Chemical products, nec  Instruments
381 Measuring, scientific, and optical
Rubber and Plastic 384 Medical and ophthalmic
305 Rubber products  386 Photographic equipment
308 Miscellaneous plastics products 
Glass, Stone, and Mineral
321 Glass products 
329 Stone, clay, concrete, etc TABLE 2:  Exposure to Imports and FDI by Aggregated BEA Industries
Import Share* FDI Share**
in % in %
Change Change
1987 1992 1996 1996/87 1987 1992 1996 1996/87
Manufacturing 12.9 14.0 16.5 3.6 7.7 11.5 11.7 4.0
Food and Kindred Products 3.7 3.7 4.1 0.4 8.4 11.9 9.9 1.5
Textile Mill Products 8.1 8.8 10.1 2.1 3.7 6.7 7.3 3.6
Apparel and Oth. Textile 24.7 29.1 33.4 8.7 1.1 3.2 4.5 3.4
Wood and Furniture 7.6 8.5 11.2 3.6 1.9 2.6 2.1 0.2
Paper 8.4 8.0 9.0 0.6 6.9 7.5 8.8 1.9
Printing and Publishing 1.1 1.2 1.5 0.4 5.4 6.6 7.3 1.9
Chemicals 7.6 9.2 11.4 3.8 26.2 32.1 31.2 5.0
Rubber and Plastic 5.7 7.5 8.6 2.8 6.6 14.8 15.4 8.8
Stone, Glass, and Mineral 8.1 9.5 10.5 2.4 14.5 20.9 21.6 7.1
Primary metals 14.8 15.0 18.1 3.3 12.2 15.9 14.4 2.2
Fabricated Metals 4.6 5.6 6.6 2.0 4.1 8.3 9.4 5.3
Industrial Machines 17.9 22.9 24.5 6.6 5.9 11.3 11.2 5.3
Electronics 20.6 25.2 27.3 6.7 12.0 17.2 18.6 6.6
Motor Vehicles 29.3 26.0 26.7 -2.6 6.6 11.0 14.6 8.0
Other Transport 7.4 9.2 12.9 5.6 1.0 4.9 4.2 3.2
Instruments 11.7 12.5 15.6 3.8 7.4 11.9 13.3 5.9
* Imports over imports plus shipments; based on Feenstra (2002), Bartelsman and Gray (2001)
** Employment in foreign-owned subsidiaries over total employment; based on Survey of Current Business, 
various issues, and Bartelsman and Gray (2001)TABLE 3: Olley-Pakes Input Elasticity Estimates
for comparison
O-P (1) O-P (2) OLS
Capital 0.300 0.251 0.200
(0.037) (0.036) (0.035)
Labor 0.466 0.456 0.463
(0.022) (0.021) (0.031)
Materials 0.256 0.276 0.164
(0.025) (0.026) (0.032)
Scale elasticity 1.022 0.983 0.827
O-P (1) includes trend, trend*SIC357 in first stage
Standard errors in parenthesesTABLE 4:  Baseline Results
One-year differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R&D 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Capacity -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Market Share -0.052 -0.195 -0.114 -0.071 0.001 -0.096
(0.091) (0.123) (0.103) (0.091) (0.129) (0.079)
Firm Markup -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Industry Markup 0.408 0.428 0.404 0.463 0.333 0.005
(0.134) (0.121) (0.130) (0.138) (0.084) (0.151)
FDI
  Current 0.547 0.352 0.375 0.894
(0.169) (0.149) (0.152) (0.226)
  Lagged One 0.543 0.339 0.238 0.550
(0.161) (0.163) (0.151) (0.202)
  Lagged Two -0.227 -0.157 -0.839 0.073
(0.163) (0.160) (0.162) (0.208)
Imports
  Current 0.431 0.134 0.780 0.349
(0.329) (0.279) (0.298) (0.385)
  Lagged One 1.133 0.781 2.803 1.108
(0.309) (0.279) (0.296) (0.356)
  Lagged Two -0.154 -0.307 1.317 0.297
(0.323) (0.322) (0.286) (0.367)
Fixed Effects
  Industry YES YES YES YES NO YES
  Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES
Obs 4202 5395 4792 4202 4202 4202
Firms 839 938 880 839 839 839
F-Test (FDI) 7.36 5.60 4.35 0.96 11.16 6.80
(P-value) (0.0001) (0.018) (0.037) (0.328) (0.000) (0.0002)
F-Test (Imports) 4.84 0.23 7.85 0.91 45.00 3.27
(P-value) (0.002) (0.632) (0.005) (0.340) (0.000) (0.021)
R-Squared 0.134 0.089 0.109 0.127 0.066 0.148
∑Coeff (FDI) 1.090 0.352 0.339 0 -0.464 1.444
∑Coeff (Imports) 1.133 0 0.781 0 4.900 1.108
Standard errors are hetero-skedasticity consistent and allow for clustering by firm
The calculation of TFP uses the coefficients from the preferred specification O-P (1)TABLE 5: Robustness - Longer Differences
Two-year Three-year One-year
differences differences differences
R&D 0.008 0.018 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Capacity -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Market Share -0.586 -0.218 -0.195
(0.194) (0.191) (0.123)
Firm Markup -0.009 -0.434 -0.009
(0.004) (0.110) (0.005)
Industry Markup 0.824 1.485 0.428
(0.235) (0.307) (0.121)
FDI - Current 0.514 0.502 0.352
(0.226) (0.257) (0.149)
Import - Current 0.504 0.552 0.134
(0.454) (0.586) (0.279)
Fixed Effects
  Industry YES YES YES
  Year YES YES YES
Industry Trends NO NO NO
Obs 2254 1572 5395
Firms 762 685 938
F-Test (FDI) 5.15 3.80 5.60
(P-value) (0.024) (0.052) (0.018)
F-Test (Imports) 1.23 0.89 0.23
(P-value) (0.268) (0.346) (0.632)
R-Squared 0.207 0.272 0.089
Standard errors are hetero-skedasticity consistent and allow for clustering by firm






Market Share -0.064 -0.129
(0.082) (0.085)
Firm Markup -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Industry Markup 0.4 0.157
(0.133) (0.152)
Change FDI EMP*
  Current 0.621 0.952
(0.166) (0.225)
  Lagged One 0.408 0.612
(0.163) (0.209)
  Lagged Two -0.094 0.154
(0.167) (0.204)
Change Total EMP**
  Current -0.084 -0.154
(0.115) (0.134)
  Lagged One -0.357 -0.246
(0.137) (0.161)
  Lagged Two -0.133 -0.245
(0.138) (0.174)
Change Imports***
  Current 0.421 0.303
(0.227) (0.252)
  Lagged One 0.693 0.743
(0.249) (0.287)
  Lagged Two -0.238 -0.054
(0.264) (0.304)
Change Total Sales****
  Current 0.117 0.038
(0.085) (0.092)
  Lagged One -0.017 -0.154
(0.104) (0.124)
  Lagged Two -0.096 -0.004
(0.082) (0.090)
Fixed Effects
  Industry YES YES
  Year YES YES
Industry Trends NO YES
Obs 4040 4040
Firms 797 797
F-Test (FDI) 6.15 6.72
(P-value) (0.0004) (0.0002)
F-Test (Imports) 3.88 2.69
(P-value) (0.009) (0.045)
R-Squared 0.147 0.158
Standard errors are hetero-skedasticity consistent and allow for clustering by firm
The calculation of TFP uses the coefficients from the preferred specification O-P (1)
*Change in FDI-EMP is absolute change in FDI employment divided by lagged total employment
**Change in Total-EMP is absolute change in total employment divided by lagged total employment
***Change in Imports is absolute change in real imports divided by lagged real imports + local production
****Change in Total Sales is absolute change in real local sales + imports divided by lagged real imports + local productionTable 7:  Robustness - Sample Split By Period
1990-1992 1994-1996 Full Sample
R&D 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Capacity -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Market Share -0.140 0.027 -0.052
(0.204) (0.081) (0.091)
Firm Markup -0.004 -0.008 -0.005
(0.001) (0.011) (0.003)
Industry Markup 0.213 0.119 0.408
(0.345) (0.188) (0.134)
FDI
  Current 0.548 1.087 0.547
(0.363) (0.334) (0.169)
  Lagged One 0.711 0.703 0.543
(0.387) (0.294) (0.161)
  Lagged Two -0.126 0.732 -0.227
(0.317) (0.339) (0.163)
Imports
  Current -1.202 0.934 0.431
(0.690) (0.657) (0.329)
  Lagged One -0.111 1.221 1.133
(0.759) (0.294) (0.309)
  Lagged Two 0.140 -1.187 -0.154
(0.589) (0.678) (0.323)
Fixed Effects
  Industry YES YES YES
  Year YES YES YES
Obs 1774 1865 4202
Firms 634 717 839
F-Test (FDI) 2.14 4.38 7.36
(P-value) (0.093) (0.005) (0.0001)
F-Test (Imports) 1.91 2.6 4.84
(P-value) (0.126) (0.051) (0.002)
R-Squared 0.089 0.198 0.134
Standard errors are hetero-skedasticity consistent and allow for clustering by firm
The calculation of TFP uses the coefficients from the preferred specification O-P (1)TABLE 8:  Robustness - Sample Split into Low & High Tech Industries
Full Sample High Tech Only Low Tech Only
Capacity -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Market Share -0.055 0.852 -0.133
(0.080) (0.993) (0.067)
Firm Markup -0.005 -0.091 -0.002
(0.003) (0.028) (0.001)
Industry Markup 0.272 0.801 -0.166
(0.111) (0.207) (0.127)
FDI
  Current 0.537 0.999 -0.171
(0.145) (0.212) (0.180)
  Lagged One 0.436 0.567 0.086
(0.141) (0.239) (0.182)
  Lagged Two -0.21 0.092 -0.291
(0.143) (0.275) (0.167)
Imports
  Current 0.495 0.421 -0.394
(0.297) (0.496) (0.345)
  Lagged One 0.943 1.001 0.489
(0.297) (0.543) (0.362)
  Lagged Two 0.306 -0.931 0.47
(0.303) (0.583) (0.360)
Fixed Effects
  Industry YES YES YES
  Year YES YES YES
Obs 5614 2686 2928
Firms 1115 525 590
F-Test (FDI) 8.17 9.47 1.38
(P-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.249)
F-Test (Imports) 4.11 2.43 1.77
(P-value) (0.007) (0.065) (0.153)
R-Squared 0.101 0.157 0.15
Standard errors are hetero-skedasticity consistent and allow for clustering by firm
The calculation of TFP uses the coefficients from the preferred specification O-P (1)
High technology industries are 281, 283, 284, 289, 357, 367, 381, 384TABLE 9: Measurement error: FDI by activity vs by mainline of business
FDI measure aggregated from￿
activities of  total employment
employment within of affiliate by
affiliate mainline of business
FDI
  Current 0.547 0.089
(0.169) (0.079)
  Lagged One 0.543 0.147
(0.161) (0.068)
  Lagged Two -0.227 -0.023
(0.163) (0.067)
Imports
  Current 0.431 0.460
(0.329) (0.334)
  Lagged One 1.133 1.061
(0.309) (0.320)
  Lagged Two -0.154 -0.072
(0.323) (0.318)
Fixed Effects
  Industry YES YES
  Year YES YES
Industry Trends NO NO
Obs 4202 4202
Firms 839 839
F-Test (FDI) 7.36 2.23
(P-value) (0.0001) (0.083)
F-Test (Imports) 4.84 3.95
(P-value) (0.002) (0.008)
∑Coeff (FDI) 1.090 0.147
Standard errors are hetero-skedasticity consistent and allow for clustering by firm
















Sales Shares in Sample and NBER Productivity Database
Sample sales share
.000027 .175058
.002047
.083846
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